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ABSTRACT
In this work, we design a new, efficient and practical Rabin-like cryp-
tosystem without using the Jacobi symbol, redundancy in the message
and avoiding the demands of extra information for finding the correct
plaintext. Decryption outputs a unique plaintext without any decryp-
tion failure. In addition, decryption only requires a single prime. Fur-
thermore, the decryption procedure only computes a single modular ex-
ponentiation instead of two modular exponentiation executed by other
Rabin variants. As a result, this reduces the computational effort dur-
ing the decryption process. Moreover the Novak’s side channel attack
is impractical over the proposed Rabin-like cryptosystem. In parallel,
we prove that the Rabin-p cryptosystem is indeed as intractable as the
integer factorization problem.
Keywords: Rabin cryptosystem, modulus N = p2q, unique decryption,
equivalent to factorization, Chinese remainder theorem.
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1. Introduction
Prior to 1970’s, encryption and decryption were done only in symmetri-
cally, until the advent of public key cryptosystem that was introduced by Diffie
and Hellman (1976). At that time, the notion of asymmetric cryptosystem is
somehow not well understood by many people. In 1978, the RSA cryptosystem
(Rivest et al., 1978) went public and it is regarded now by the cryptographic
community as the first practical realization of the asymmetric cryptosystem.
The security of the RSA was based on the intractability to solve the modular
eth-root problem coupled with the integer factorization problem (IFP) of the
form N = pq, where p and q are distinct and equal bit-size primes.
In 1979, another cryptosystem was introduced which is based on the in-
tractability to solve the modular square root problem of a composite integer,
namely the Rabin cryptosystem (Rabin, 1979). In fact, this cryptosystem is
the first public key system of its kind that was proven equivalent to factoring
N = pq. At the first glance, we might consider the Rabin cryptosystem as
an RSA variant with the use of the public exponent e = 2 apart from the
RSA with public exponent e ≥ 3. Interestingly, this claim is not necessar-
ily true since by definition, the value of public key e for the RSA requires
gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1 where φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1), yet in the case of Rabin cryp-
tosystem is gcd(e = 2, φ(N)) 6= 1. In addition, the role of the public exponent
e = 2 from the Rabin encryption gives a computational advantage over the
RSA cryptosystem.
The encryption of Rabin (1979) is computed by executing a single squar-
ing modulo N . This is far more efficient by comparison to RSA encryption,
which requires the calculation of at least a cubic modulo N = pq (Menezes
et al., 1997). Based on recent results in this area the public exponent for RSA
must be sufficiently large, thus Rabin has some advantage regarding this mat-
ter (Lenstra and Verheul, 2001). On the other hand, the process for Rabin’s
decryption breaks up into two parts. First is the calculation of two modular
exponentiations, and secondly the computation of the Chinese Remainder The-
orem (CRT) for recombination of the congruence’s. Here the efficiency of the
Rabin decryption is slightly faster than the RSA.
The Rabin encryption function is in the form c ≡ m2 (mod N), where
N = pq such that p, q are primes congruence 3 (mod 4). This modular square
roots problem is considered to be as hard as the IFP. In other words, it is
mathematically proven that a random plaintext can be recovered completely
from the ciphertext, if and only if the adversary is able to efficiently factoring
the public key N = pq. On the contrary, the RSA encryption in the form
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c = me (mod N) might be easier than factoring problem. This is the case
because the equivalent of RSA encryption function vis-a-vis factoring is not
yet proven (Boneh, 1999). Therefore, the process of finding the eth root is
might be possible without initially the need to factor N = pq. The security
of the RSA encryption scheme is merely based on the strong assumption that
the modular eth root problem is a one-way function. Up to this very moment,
the publicly known methods to find the eth root is only with a machine that is
capable to efficiently factor the RSA modulus N = pq.
Motivation. In principle, the Rabin cryptosystem is very efficient because
only a modular squaring operation is required for encryption; furthermore, it
is proven to be as difficult as the IFP. Unfortunately, the Rabin cryptosystem
suffers from two major drawbacks; the foremost one is because the Rabin’s
decryption produces four possible candidates, thus introduces ambiguity to de-
cide the correct message out of four possible values. Another drawback is from
the fact that its equivalence relation to factorization. These two disadvantages
of the Rabin encryption scheme prevented it from widespread practical use.
Hence, attempts were made by numerous researchers with the objective
to turn the Rabin cryptosystem to be as practical and implementable as the
RSA cryptosystem. See Section 2.3 of this paper. Broadly speaking, all the
previous attempts made seem to employ one or more additional features in
order to obtain a unique decryption result, at the same time resulting in a free
decryption failure Rabin-like cryptosystem. One of the ways to accomplish this
is through manipulation of some mathematical objects such as the role of the
Jacobi symbol. Also, it can be done by designing an encryption function with
a special message structure. Yet, at the same time all the designs are losing
the computational advantage of the original Rabin’s encryption over the RSA
cryptosystem.
Our Contributions. In order to engage this problem and to overcome
all the shortcomings, further theoretical analysis and mathematical proves are
needed. In this paper, our objective is to refine the Rabin cryptosystem in order
to overcome all the previous drawbacks of its original design and its variants.
We present an efficient and practical Rabin-like cryptosystem without using the
Jacobi symbol, message redundancy technique or sending extra information in
order to specify the correct plaintext. In addition, decryption only requires a
single prime. Furthermore, the decryption procedure only computes a single
modular exponentiation instead of two modular exponentiation executed by
other Rabin variants. As a consequence, this brings down the computational
effort during the decryption operation and most importantly, decryption out-
puts a unique plaintext without any decryption failure and resilient to Novak’s
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side channel analysis. In parallel, we prove that the Rabin-p cryptosystem is
indeed as intractable as the IFP.
Paper Organization. Section 2 introduces the notion of public key en-
cryption and the description of the original Rabin cryptosystem. This section
also provides a survey for Rabin’s variants and then provide a list of draw-
backs from previous strategies that need to be avoided. Section 3 highlight the
methodology of the research performed. Later in this section we also give a
list of useful lemmas. We end this section with the description of our proposal,
namely the Rabin-p cryptosystem, along with its proof of correctness. This
is followed by proving that Rabin-p cryptosystem is indeed as intractable as
the IFP and its related computational reducibility in Section 4 and Section 5,
respectively. We put a conclusion in the final section.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Asymmetric Encryption
In the classical system, the secret key is supposedly being shared between
the sender and the receiver in a symmetrical manner. In order to maintain
the secrecy, the key must be shared or distributed securely to both parties.
However, the process of exchanging secret keys is problematic when the number
of users gets larger since more keys are needed to be delivered to various parties.
To tackle this problem, Diffie and Hellman (1976) has came up with the notion
of asymmetric encryption.
Definition 2.1. (Diffie and Hellman, 1976). LetM denote the message space,
C denote the ciphertext space, K denote the key space, m denote the plaintext
and c denote the ciphertext. The asymmetric encryption scheme is defined as
follows.
1. Key generation algorithm K is a probabilistic algorithm that will generate
a public key denoted as e ∈ K and private key as d ∈ K respectively.
2. Encryption algorithm E is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a message
m ∈M and the public key e, to produce a ciphertext c ∈ C as a function
of c = Ee(m).
3. Decryption algorithm D is a deterministic algorithm which is given the
ciphertext c and the private key d, will output m. That is m = Dd(c).
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Basically, if a cryptosystem that uses the same secret keys and shared by
both; sender and receiver, then it is called as symmetric cryptosystem. If a
cryptosystem involves a private key and public key, then the cryptosystem is
known as an asymmetric cryptosystem or commonly referred to as public key
cryptosystem.
Definition 2.2. (Proof of Correctness). For each pairs of key (e, d) ∈ K output
by the algorithm K, and for every message m ∈M and ciphertext c ∈ C then
Dd(c) = Dd(Ee(m)) = m.
2.2 Rabin Cryptosystem
In this section, we present the Rabin cryptosystem. We begin with a de-
scription for the key generation as the following procedure. The private key
consists of two random and distinct primes p and q, each satisfies 3 (mod 4)
and the public key is the product N = pq.
Algorithm 1 Rabin Key Generation Algorithm
Input: The size k of the security parameter
Output: The public key N and the private key (p, q)
1: Choose two random and distinct primes p and q such that 2k < p, q < 2k+1
satisfy p, q ≡ 3 (mod 4)
2: Compute N = pq
3: Compute two integers r, s such that rp+ sq = 1
4: Return the public key N and the private key (p, q)
To encrypt a plaintext m, the Rabin encryption algorithm does the follow-
ing.
Algorithm 2 Rabin Encryption Algorithm
Input: The plaintext m and the public key N
Output: A ciphertext c
1: Choose integer 0 < m < N such that gcd(m,N) = 1
2: Compute c ≡ m2 (mod N).
3: Return the ciphertext c.
To decrypt a ciphertext with the private key p and q, the Rabin cryptosys-
tem does the following.
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Algorithm 3 Rabin Decryption Algorithm
Input: A ciphertext c and the private key (p, q)
Output: The plaintext m
1: Compute mp ≡ c p+14 (mod p)
2: Compute mq ≡ c q+14 (mod q)
3: Compute m1 ≡ rpmq + sqmp (mod N)
4: Compute m2 ≡ rpmq − sqmp (mod N)
5: Compute m3 ≡ −m2 (mod N)
6: Compute m4 ≡ −m1 (mod N)
7: Return the correct plaintext m amongst the four possible candidates
2.3 A Survey for Rabin variants
It is very interesting to witness continuous efforts in searching for practical
and optimal Rabin cryptosystem by numerous scholars. We put forward a
survey for Rabin’s variants as follows.
Williams (1980) makes an attempt to solve the 4-to-1 situation by incorpo-
rating the Jacobi symbol. Through this approach, Rabin-Williams scheme suc-
cessfully provided unique decryption while maintaining the property of breaking
such scheme is equivalence to factoring.
Subsequently, the same approach of using the Jacobi symbol with Rabin
cryptosystem was proposed by Kurosawa et al. (1988). In the Kurosawa et al.
(1988) scheme, the encryptor will compute and send two extra bits of informa-
tion along with its ciphertext purposely to specify the correct square root (i.e
the intended message). However, both encrypt-decrypt processes require the
Jacobi symbol computation. This result in turn leads to additional computa-
tional cost.
Menezes et al. (1997) proposed a redundancy to the message, which is a
technique to append the plaintext with repeating l least significant bits of the
message before applying Rabin function upon it. With the help of adding some
redundancies onto the message, the decryption process then is likely will give a
unique output. This scheme has a probability 1
2l−1 of decryption failure, where
l is the length of the least significant bits of the message.
Takagi (1997) proposed a Rabin-type cryptosystem with an alternative
modulus choice of N = p2q. Boneh (2001) suggest an elegant strategy; im-
posing some special properties to the plaintext (i.e. padding scheme and mes-
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sage restriction) before encryption of which contribute to produce a unique
message with high probability. Rabin-Boneh cryptosystem is considered as an
optimal Rabin-type encryption in term of efficiency since it does not use the
Jacobi symbol while the message output of the decryption process is unique
with high probability. Notice that, the problem with introducing a padding or
redundancy to a plaintext is the decryption may fail with a small probability.
Industrial giants, Hitachi (2002) also made a contribution regarding the
use of modulus N = p2q as depicted earlier by Takagi (1997) (i.e.Rabin-Takagi
cryptosystem). Basically, HIME(R) and Rabin-Takagi are quite similar in term
of performing the Rabin function for encryption and solving modular square
root with modulus N = p2q as parts of their decryption process. However,
the method used by the HIME(R) decryption to solve the square roots modulo
N = p2q is significantly different from the Rabin-Takagi.
Schmidt-Samoa (2006) introduced a new Rabin-type trapdoor permutation
which is proven as difficult as factoring N = p2q. Even though it is indeed a
Rabin variant, however, we will not consider it in this paper. The reason is
because one of our objectives is actually to find a better answer to solving the
Rabin’s 4−to−1 decryption problem, whilst the decryption of Schmidt-Samoa
cryptosystem produces a p−to−1 mapping.
Freeman et al. (2013) propose a design of Rabin-like cryptosystem which
require to sends extra bits and relies extensively on the Jacobi symbol. How-
ever, the entire computed Jacobi symbol in this scheme is embedded implicitly
in the ciphertext. This is in contrast to the design of Kurosawa et al. (2001),
which does clearly expose such information as a part of the ciphertext. We
observe that the usage of the Jacobi symbol during key generation, the encryp-
tion and decryption procedure implies extra computations. Furthermore, this
cryptosystem still leaks the most significant bit of the plaintext m (Galbraith,
2012).
Recently, a new Rabin variant proposed by Elia et al. (2015). The design
of this newly Rabin-like cryptosystem exploiting the Dedekind’s sums theorem
for the identification processes amongst the four possible roots.
2.4 Pre-Conditions
In this section, we initiate a list that describes the drawback of the previous
strategies to overcome the Rabin weaknesses. This list provides conditions that
needed to be avoided in any attempt to refine the Rabin scheme.
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2.4.1 The Use of Jacobi Symbol
The requirement to compute Jacobi symbol possibly during the key genera-
tion, encryption or decryption makes the system less efficient (Boneh, 2001). In
terms of computational performance, a Rabin-like cryptosystem is extremely
fast as long as this process does not require for computing a Jacobi symbol
(Galbraith, 2012).
2.4.2 Message Redundancy and Padding Mechanism
Some schemes introduce redundancy upon the message or design padding
mechanism aiming to achieve an efficient way to determine the correct plaintext
from its four possible candidates. For instance, as for the HIME(R) cryptosys-
tem that applies the OAEP scheme (Hitachi, 2002) and the Rabin-Boneh with
a padding mechanism that designated to be simpler than OAEP (Boneh, 2001).
However, both methods still have a small probability for decryption failure.
2.4.3 Novak’s Side Channel Analysis
In general, the decryption algorithm of a Rabin-like cryptosystem consists of
two parts. The first part is for the modular exponentiation operation of which in
order to obtain the message in the form ofm modulo p andm modulo q from its
corresponding ciphertext c. The second part then would be the recombination
process using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) algorithm to recover
the proper message m. Most side channel attacks deal with the first part.
For instance, from the work by Kocher (1996), Schindler (2000) and Brumley
and Boneh (2005) which uses the timing analysis approach or the result in
Messerges et al. (1999) enables side channel analysis using the power analysis
approach. Alternatively, Novak (2002) proposed a very efficient side channel
analysis upon the CRT computation (i.e. the second part of the Rabin-like
decryption).
From the survey done in Section 2.3, we observe that all variants of the
Rabin-like cryptosystem (except Rabin-Williams scheme) involves a process
that depends heavily on the CRT or Garner’s algorithm (i.e. the process to
recover all the modulo square roots). Therefore, Novak’s analysis is indeed
applicable for such computation, of which can result in the insecurity of the
cryptosystems (Okeya and Takagi, 2006).
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3. Our Propose Scheme
3.1 Methodology
In this section, we outline the methodology to overcome the drawbacks of
the Rabin cryptosystem. Firstly, we assign the condition on the modulus to
be used is of the type N = p2q. We observed that such modulus claimed to
be no easier as to factoring the standard N = pq (Castagnos et al., 2009).
This statement is supported by the fact that many RSA-like cryptosystems are
designed using such modulus (Asbullah and Ariffin, 2015). We then impose
restriction on the plaintext m and ciphertext c space as m ∈ Zp2 and c ∈ Zp2q,
respectively. From the plaintext-ciphertext expansion, such restriction leads to
a system that is not a length-preserving for the message.
Let m and c be the plaintext and ciphertext and c(m) be the function of
c taking m as its input. Suppose, for example, the plaintext spaces and the
ciphertext spaces in the RSA cryptosystem are the same. Thus we denote the
function for the RSA cryptosystem as c(m) : Zpq −→ Zpq. Note that this sit-
uation could be an advantage for the RSA scheme since RSA encryption has
no message expansion. However, this is not true for all cryptosystems. For
example, the plaintext-ciphertext mapping for Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosys-
tem (Okamoto and Uchiyama, 1998) is c(m) : Zp −→ Zp2 , Pailier cryptosystem
(Paillier, 1999) and the cryptosystem proposed by Galindo et al. (2002) is c(m) :
Zpq −→ Z(pq)2 , Rabin-Boneh (Boneh, 2001) mapping is c(m) : Z pq
2
−→ Zpq and
the Rabin variant introduced by Ariffin et al. (2013) and Schmidt-Samoa (2006)
is c(m) : Zpq −→ Zp2q.
The maximum size for the message is defined by the plaintext space. One
way to do it would be to tell the user a maximum number of bits for the
plaintext messages. If we view the message as merely the keys for a symmet-
ric encryption scheme, meaning that the message is indeed a short message,
then this is not a big issue since many other schemes also implemented such
approach. Therefore, we contend that the restriction of message space would
turn a restriction is not an issue.
3.2 Useful Lemmas
Lemma 3.1. (Kumanduri and Romero, 1998). Let p be a prime number such
that p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and c an integer such that gcd(c, p) = 1. The congruence
c ≡ m2 (mod p) has either no solutions or exactly two solutions. If m1 is a
solution, then −m1 (mod p) is the other solution.
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Lemma 3.2. (Kumanduri and Romero, 1998). Let p be a prime number such
that p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and c an integer such that gcd(c, p) = 1. The congruence
c ≡ m2 (mod p2) has exactly two solutions if c ≡ m2 (mod p) has exactly two
solutions.
Lemma 3.3. Consider Lemma 3.2. Let c ≡ m2 (mod p2). Then m1 = mp+jp
is a solution to c ≡ m2 (mod p2) where mp ≡ c p+14 (mod p), j ≡ i2mp (mod p)
such that i = c−mp
2
p . Furthermore m2 ≡ −m1 (mod p2) is the other solution.
Proof. Suppose we consider c ≡ m2 (mod p2) as in Lemma 3.2. Let mp ≡ c p+14
(mod p) such that mp2 ≡ c (mod p). Suppose that m1 = mp+ jp is a solution
for c ≡ m2 (mod p2), then we have
c ≡ m21
≡ (mp + jp)2
≡ mp2 + 2mpjp (mod p2) (1)
Then, rearrange (1) as
2mpjp ≡ c−mp2 (mod p2) (2)
Note that from mp2 ≡ c (mod p), we have c − mp2 ≡ 0 (mod p) which
means that c − mp2 is a multiple of p. Let ip = c − mp2 for some integer i,
then we obtain i = c−mp
2
p . We then rewrite (2) as
2mpjp ≡ ip (mod p2),
of which such congruence implies that 2mpj ≡ i (mod p). Hence, we obtain
j ≡ i2mp (mod p). To conclude, we have the solution m1 = mp + jp such that
c ≡ m12 (mod p2). Furthermore, we observe that m2 ≡ −m1 (mod p2) is the
other solution as in Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.4. Consider Lemma 3.3. If m1 and m2 are the two distinct integers
solution for c ≡ m2 (mod p2), then m1 +m2 = p2.
Proof. Suppose m1 6≡ m2 (mod p2) such that m12 ≡ m22 ≡ c (mod p2). Ob-
serve that, from Lemma 3.3 if m1 is a solution for c ≡ m2 (mod p2), then
m2 ≡ −m1 (mod p2) is also a solution. Thus, m2 ≡ −m1 (mod p2) can be
reinterpreted as m2 = p2 −m1. Hence m1 +m2 = p2.
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Lemma 3.5. Let m1 and m2 be integers such that m1 +m2 = p2 with p2 is
an odd integer. Then either m1 or m2 is less than p
2
2 .
Proof. Suppose p2 is an odd integer, then by definition p
2
2 must not be an
integer. Let m1 +m2 = p2. Since that m1 and m2 are integers, therefore m1
and m2 must not be equal to p
2
2 .
Suppose we consider the following cases. If for both m1 and m2 are less
than p
2
2 , then we should have m1 +m2 < p
2. Therefore this case contradicts
with the fact that m1+m2 = p2. On the other hand, if m1 and m2 are greater
than p
2
2 , then we should have m1 +m2 > p
2, which also contradicts with the
fact that m1 +m2 = p2. Hence, we consider the case where either m1 or m2
is less than p
2
2 . Let m1 <
p2
2 , then there exists a real number 1 such that
m1 + 1 =
p2
2 . On the other hand, since m1 <
p2
2 , then m2 must be greater
than p
2
2 . Therefore there exists a real number 2 such that m2− 2 = p
2
2 . If we
add up these equations, we have
(m1 + 1) + (m2 − 2) = p
2
2
+
p2
2
= p2
Since m1 + m2 = p2, thus 1 − 2 should be equal to zero, meaning that
1 = 2. We conclude that only one of m1 or m2 is less than p
2
2 .
3.3 The Rabin-p Cryptosystem
In this section, we provide the details of the proposed cryptosystem namely
Rabin-p Cryptosystem. Rabin-p is named after the Rabin cryptosystem with
the additional p symbolizing that the proposed scheme only uses a single prime
p as the decryption key. This section is structured as follows. We first describe
the Rabin-p key generation, encryption and decryption procedures. We then
provide the explanation of the Rabin-p decryption process.
The key generation algorithm of the Rabin-p cryptosystem (Algorithm 4)
produces two random and distinct primes p and q of the same length such
that p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and q ≡ 3 (mod 4). The key generation algorithm then
produces an integer N as a product N = p2q, which is denoted as the public
key. The private key is the prime p.
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Algorithm 4 Rabin-p Key Generation Algorithm
Input: The size k of the security parameter
Output: The public key N = p2q and the private key p
1: Choose two random and distinct primes p and q such that 2k < p, q < 2k+1
satisfy p, q ≡ 3 (mod 4)
2: Compute N = p2q
3: Return the public key N and the private key p
The encryption algorithm (Algorithm 5) takes the plaintext m < 22k−1 and
compute c ≡ m2 (mod N). We observe that the message m is restricted to the
range of m < 22k−1 = 2
2k
2 <
p2
2 < p
2. The output is the ciphertext c.
Algorithm 5 Rabin-p Encryption Algorithm
Input: The plaintext m and the public key N
Output: A ciphertext c
1: Choose plaintext 0 < m < 22k−1 such that gcd(m,N) = 1
2: Compute c ≡ m2 (mod N)
3: Return the ciphertext c
To decrypt a ciphertext, the Rabin-p decryption algorithm with the private
key p does the following.
Algorithm 6 Rabin-p Decryption Algorithm
Input: A ciphertext c and the private key p
Output: The plaintext m
1: Compute w ≡ c (mod p)
2: Compute mp ≡ w p+14 (mod p)
3: Compute i = c−mp
2
p
4: Compute j ≡ i2mp (mod p)
5: Compute m1 = mp + jp
6: If m1 < 22k−1, then return m = m1. Else, return m = p2 −m1
We observe that the decryption algorithm needs only a single prime number
as its key. In addition, only one modular exponentiation is taking place during
the decryption process. Such computational advantage would positively affect
the overall operations.
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Remark 3.1. We reason that since our proposed scheme does not need to
carry out any CRT computation, thus the Novak’s attack is not applicable on
the Rabin-p cryptosystem (i.e. resilient against Novak’s attack).
3.4 Proof of Correctness for Rabin-p Decryption
Proposition 3.1. Let c ≡ m2 (mod N) be the Rabin-p ciphertext. Then Al-
gorithm 6 is correct.
Proof. Suppose c ≡ m2 (mod N) be the Rabin-p ciphertext where N = p2q,
thus we have c − m2 ≡ 0 (mod N). Since p2 | N , then p2 | c − m2. Since
m < p2, therefore it is sufficient just solving for c ≡ m2 (mod p2) which is
efficiently be solved using Lemma 3.3. In addition, according to Lemma 3.2,
there are exactly two distinct solution m1 and m2 satisfies c ≡ m2 (mod p2).
From Lemma 3.4 we have m1 +m2 = p2. We now show that the Algorithm 6
only produce a unique solution for m < 22k−1. Observe that the upper bound
for m < p
2
2 . Consider Lemma 3.5, then we have either m1 or m2 is less than
p2
2 such that m1 +m2 = p
2 satisfy m < 22k−1. Finally, we conclude that only
one of m1 or m2 are less than p
2
2 and will be outputted by Algorithm 6 as the
unique m < 22k−1.
4. Equivalent to Factoring N = p2q
In this section, we show that if there exists someone or an algorithm can
anyhow decrypt the message m from the Rabin-p’s ciphertext, then that some-
one must be also able to factor N = p2q. Observe the following.
Proposition 4.1. Let N = p2q, m < 22k−1 and 22k−1 < mˆ < p2 such that
m+ mˆ = p2. Then gcd(m+ mˆ,N) = p2.
Proof. Suppose 2k < p < 2k+1, then 22k < p2 < 22k+2, and 22k−1 < p
2
2 <
22k+1. Suppose m < 22k−1, then from Lemma 3.5 there exists another integer
mˆ > 22k−1 such that m+ mˆ = p2. Thus this implies p2 − mˆ = m < 22k−1.
Now, we determine the range of the mˆ such that p2 − mˆ < 22k−1. Then we
obtain the lower bound for mˆ, of which
mˆ > p2 − 22k−1 > 22k − 22k−1 = 22k−1
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and upper bounded by mˆ < p2. Take the gcd(m + mˆ,N), then we obtain p2.
Hence q = Np2 .
From here, with the help from the Algorithm 6, we can build a factoring
algorithm for N . The factoring algorithm is defined as follows.
Algorithm 7 Algorithm for Factoring N = p2q
Input: A ciphertext c and the modulus N
Output: The prime factors p,q
1: Choose an integer 22k−1 < mˆ < 22k
2: Compute cˆ ≡ mˆ2 (mod N)
3: Ask the decryption of cˆ from Algorithm 6
4: Algorithm 6 output m < 22k−1, else reject
5: Compute gcd(mˆ+m,N)
6: If gcd(mˆ+m,N) = 1, then reject
7: If gcd(mˆ+m,N) 6= 1, then return p2
8: Compute Np2 = q
9: Return the prime factors p, q
5. Computational Reducibility
If a new cryptosystem is designed, we are expected to provide a comparison
of the relative difficulty of breaking the scheme to the solving any existing hard
problems. We begin with the following definitions.
Definition 5.1 (Computational Reduction). Let A and B be two different
cryptographic hard problems. We say that a problem A is reducible to a problem
B if by any mean we able to show that for an algorithm that solves problem B
then such algorithm also solves the problem A.
Definition 5.2 (Computational Equivalent). Let A and B be two different
cryptographic hard problems. A problem A is said to be equivalent to problem
B if and only if the problem A is reducible to problem B and vice-versa.
Now, we show that breaking the Rabin-p cryptosystem is indeed reducible
to factoring the modulusN = p2q. Furthermore, the converse of such statement
is also true.
Lemma 5.1. Breaking the Rabin-p cryptosystem is reducible to factoring N =
p2q.
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Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A1 with the ability to factor the
modulus N = p2q, then we obtain the primes p and q. Thus, we can solve the
Rabin-p’s ciphertext c ≡ m2 (mod N) directly by using the Algorithm 6.
Lemma 5.2. Factoring N = p2q is reducible to breaking the Rabin-p cryp-
tosystem.
Proof. Conversely, suppose there exists an algorithm A2 that breaks the Rabin-
p cryptosystem. Then such algorithm is able to find the message m from the
ciphertext c ≡ m2 (mod N). By using the same approach as Proposition 4.1,
hence A2 can proceed to compute mˆ. Finally, with the help of Algorithm 7,
A2 can easily factor the modulus N = p2q.
Proposition 5.1. Breaking the Rabin-p cryptosystem is equivalence to factor-
ing the modulus N = p2q.
Proof. This assertion is a consequence from Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2.
Remark 5.1. In other words, it is mathematically proven that a random plain-
text can be recovered completely from the ciphertext, if and only if we are able
to efficiently factoring the public key N = p2q.
6. Conclusion
This study can be viewed as another look at the design of the Rabin cryp-
tosystem, from a different view. Our proposed cryptosystem namely the Rabin-
p cryptosystem is purposely designed with the objective to avoid the Jacobi
symbol, redundancy in the message and the demands of extra information for
finding the correct plaintext. We observe that the decryption process outputs
a unique plaintext without any decryption failure while requires only a single
prime number. We further show that the decryption procedure only computes
a single modular exponentiation instead of two modular exponentiation exe-
cuted by other Rabin variants. As a result, this reduces the computational
effort during the decryption process. Finally, we show that Rabin-p cryptosys-
tem is indeed as intractable as the integer factorization problem.
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